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ABSTRACT
Reactive aggression is retaliatory behavior in response to a transgression from
another, especially when self-control is compromised through cognitive exhaustion.
This defensive reaction is especially pronounced when the transgression is made
public, increasing the intensity of the status-threat experienced, but research is mixed
on whether this is due to the experience of shame or damage to self-esteem. Selfaffirmation has been used in a variety of studies to reduce defensiveness and increase
prosocial behavior, but there have been no studies to explore the effects of selfaffirmation on reactive aggression in non-clinical populations. Drawing from an
undergraduate college student population (N=101), the present study examined the
effects of self-affirmation and cognitive depletion tasks on the propensity to react
aggressively in the Point Subtraction Aggression Paradigm (PSAP), while measuring
changes in implicit experiential state shame (ESS). State shame was found to be
related to aggressive reaction; this shame was exacerbated by cognitive depletion and
mediated by self-affirmation. The effects found were weak in a mixed sex sample, and
this may be due to how males are differentially affected by the self-affirmation task,
particularly when they are from a college student population. Gender differences and a
critique of how aggression is operationally defined in research are discussed as
confounding variables and suggested as potential areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“If the path of the peacemaker, of happiness, is being open and receptive and one with
your experience, then settling the score is the path of making war, whereby aggression
gives birth to aggression and violence gives birth to violence. Nothing is settled.
Nothing is made even. But the mind of settling the score does not take that into
consideration. When you are caught by that mind, because of the highly charged and
ever-expanding emotionality you’re going through, you do not see what settling the
score is really doing.”
-

From Choosing Peace (November 18, 2015) by Pema Chödrön
The Social Valuation of Aggression
Aggression can be defined as any kind of behavior, physical or verbal, that is

intended to cause harm to another individual or group, and it is often categorized into
two types – hostile or instrumental. Hostile aggression, better known in the literature
as reactive aggression, is a spontaneous reaction based on increased feelings of anger.
Instrumental aggression is the premeditated intent to injure, but as a means to an end,
such as gaining, regaining, or maintaining status. Arguably, both reactive and
premeditated aggression seem to have the same underlying mechanisms and
motivations to mediate self-threat, but the relationship between these motivations and
reactive aggression are less obvious because they are implicit. For example,
frustration-aggression theory posits that frustration induces anger thereby increasing a
readiness to aggress. Frustration is anything that blocks us from attaining our goal,
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arising as a result of the disconnect between expectations and attainments, similar to
the discomfort we experience during cognitive dissonance when our expected attitudes
fail to line up with our exhibited behaviors. Frustration arises when one feels
disrespected (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996; D. Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz,
1996; Felson, 1978; Miller 2001) and also when someone feels as if they have been
treated unfairly (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). One may react to implicit
motivations to regain status in the moment (reactive), or may ruminate on how to
regain that status in the future (premeditated). But how do we learn what types of
behaviors will help us to regain that status?
Learned social behavior theory hypothesizes that we learn about aggressive
behavior by experiencing the reward or punishment in response to that behavior. Later
research by Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1961) suggested that we do not have to be
directly involved but rather can watch behavior and subsequent consequences in order
to facilitate learning; this version was termed observational or Social Learning Theory.
Subsequent research supporting Social Learning Theory observed that children who
are physically aggressive usually come from physically punitive parents (Patterson,
Chamberlain, & Reid, 1982) and that 30% of those children will go on to abuse their
own children, a rate four times greater than those who do not come from such a
background (Kaufman & Zigler, 1987; Widom, 1989). Although the simple
explanation for this seems to be that children who see or experience aggressive
behavior in general will later exhibit similar behavior, the link may not be so direct. A
later study found that spanking can be linked to aggression later in life, but when
controlling for extreme forms of punishment and isolating families who deliver “tough
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love,” these effects all but disappear (Gershoff, 2002). This implies that it is not
simply the experience of physical punishment that directly leads to being aggressive,
but rather there is some influence of the punisher’s intentionality that manifests itself
later in life. In other words, children who are physically abused, as opposed to
experiencing the culturally acceptable “tough love,” learn to develop self-worth
contingent on how others treat them, a type of social comparison. They may grow up
to be more aggressive because their sense of self-worth is more sensitive to negative
judgment and unjustified punishment from others, and as such, the need to protect
their self-worth may be more easily triggered.
There is more evidence that cultural cues play a key role in determining how
someone becomes more prone to aggression. Some cultures, including mainstream
America, value “toughness” in the form of masculinity, but additionally, the cultural
value of defending one’s honor, as in the American South (Vandello, Cohen, &
Ransom, 2008), increases both direct (e.g., physical) and indirect (e.g., gossiping)
aggression as a way to compensate for any threats to status (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle,
& Schwarz, 1996; Miller, 2001; Nisbett, 1993; Willer, Rogalin, Conlon, &
Wojnowicz, 2013; Wilson & Daly, 1985). Aggression is simultaneously taught to be a
negative behavior, and socialized as an acceptable way to (re)affirm one’s self-worth.
The cultural cues do not have to be from direct exposure to aggression, but can come
in the form of exposure to objects and concepts that are associated with normalized or
valued forms of interpersonal aggression, a process called priming. In one longitudinal
study in Chicago, those who had even indirect exposure to gun violence were twice as
likely to participate in violent acts themselves (Bingenheimer, Brennan, & Earls,
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2005). Simply holding a gun can prime a person to have hostile thoughts and punitive
judgments. However, this effect is limited to those who only have exposure to guns as
representing status or dominance, and is not seen in those whose exposure is
utilitarian, such as a hunter handling a rifle (Anderson, Benjamin, & Bartholow, 1998;
Dienstbier et al., 1998). Further, moderate priming effects have been found after
media consumption, including television and video games, resulting in direct (e.g.,
Eron, 1987) and indirect aggression, such as gossiping and ostracizing (Coyne &
Archer, 2005) in children.
In addition to normalizing aggression as a means to self-affirm, media often
label aggressive acts as “justified” or “unjustified,” giving a person excuses to draw on
when trying to reduce the cognitive dissonance. The Fundamental Attribution Error
(Ross, 1977) is one cognitive shortcut wherein we view our own negative actions as
having some sort of external justification and blame the negative actions of others on
internal traits, maintaining our worth while decreasing theirs. This works in reverse for
positive actions. We tend to attribute our own positive acts to our own internal traits;
however, if the positive act is that of another, we tend to attribute it to outer
circumstances (Malle, 2006). This also perpetuates the just-world phenomenon, or the
idea that “you get what you give,” which in addition to justifying our direct actions,
helps us justify not acting when we see others being victimized (Furnham, 2003). This
is enhanced through our ability to depersonalize others to further reduce cognitive
dissonance when our explicit actions (or inactions) do not match the values we claim
to hold.
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The Social Learning Theory of aggression is generally supported throughout
the literature, but the misconception that the effects of exposure to aggression are a
direct influence on behavior and not part of a larger system of self-worth evaluation
and social comparison needs to be more comprehensively addressed. For example,
there are children who grow up in violent neighborhoods and therefore would be
expected to become violent themselves, but they do not. This exposure to violence,
directly or through media, may not be the driving force behind why people resort to
aggression in the face of adversity. Rather, it may be the direct experience of feeling
ashamed when experiencing aggression that normalizes using external sources to
determine self-worth, which, in turn, sensitizes one to self-threat and normalizes the
use of aggression when attempting to compensate for it.
Research to date has not attempted to make much of a connection regarding the
relationship between self-worth compensation, self-affirmation, and shame,
particularly in non-clinical populations. This research attempts to fill that void.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Reactive Aggression
Reactive aggression is a retaliatory response to actual or perceived
provocation, often associated with a lack of impulse control (DeWall, Baumeister,
Stillman, & Gailliot, 2006). A study done with criminal offenders showed relations
between decreased self-control and a variety of undesirable behaviors, such as
negative interactions and assaults on prison staff, substance abuse, rule breaking (e.g.,
carrying a weapon), and retaliatory actions against other inmates (DeLisi, Hochstetler,
Higgins, Beaver, & Graeve, 2008). In a later study (Denson, Capper, Oaten, Friese, &
Schofield, 2011), reactive aggression was shown to be reduced by going through selfcontrol training, particularly in those who scored higher in aggression initially.
Aggression as a Response to Status Threat
There is no shortage of studies that find aggression as a response to status
threat. Status is often reflected in how one is treated by others. When one feels
disrespected, it is interpreted as a direct threat to their status. Studies have repeatedly
shown that disrespect provokes anger, with increased aggression if that disrespect is
made in a public setting (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996; D. Cohen et al., 1996; Felson,
1978; Miller, 2001). Because status is determined through social comparison, it is no
wonder that being socially disrespected increases the effects of shame and subsequent
action to regain status. One could argue that aggression in response to being shamed is
a form of self-affirmation. Even just through affirming “toughness” prior to a threat,
6

one can proactively maintain their status, effectively avoiding shame (D. Cohen et al.,
1996; Lukeszowski, Simmons, Anderson, & Roney, 2016). Particularly in cultures
that value defending one’s honor, such as the American South or violent gangs, as
well as cultures socializing hegemonic masculinity, this fast and firm reaction to a
status threat is imperative, as anything less is perceived as weak (D. Cohen et al.,
1996; Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 2009; Miller, 2001; Nisbett, 1993;
Wilson & Daly, 1985). Because direct aggression is more easily measured than
indirect, and men are socialized to exhibit masculinity in the form of direct, physical
aggression, it is often overlooked that women also commit aggressive acts in response
to status threat, because these acts are often more indirect and verbal (Willer et al.,
2013).
It is important to note that the higher one perceives their status to be, the more
they value that social positioning (Blader & Chen, 2012). So even though higher status
individuals are protected to some extent from lower level threats, they often respond
more intensely to acute threats to their position (Gruenwald, Kemeny, & Aziz, 2006),
which indicates that one can have a high sense of self-worth, but if it is based on
external sources of validation, they are just as, if not more, susceptible to shame. This
may explain the mixed results in studies that look at implicit and explicit self-esteem
in the face of a threat to self-worth, particularly when a person is being measured
against someone higher in status. Several experiments have shown that experiencing
this threat actually increases implicit self-esteem through compensation but reduces
explicit self-esteem (e.g., Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), while other studies have
shown explicit self-esteem to increase (e.g., Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Pyszczynski,
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Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). Conversely, another study looked at
high versus low self-esteem as a moderator for self-affirmation effectiveness and
found no relationship (Harris & Napper, 2005). This also offers an explanation for
why studies find that narcissists tend to express anger and use aggression when
attempting to avoid negative experiences (e.g., shame; Bushman et al., 2009). It
appears that aggression, therefore, is a reaction to a threat to one’s status and selfworth, particularly if they are founded on an external source of validation.
Self-Affirmation: An Internal Source of Validation
Self-affirmation theory states that “people are motivated to preserve a positive,
moral, and adaptive self-image and to maintain self-integrity” and that this process can
be accomplished through reinforcing core values that are particularly important to the
person, increasing one’s self-worth (Steele, 1988). Some of the earlier studies using
this theory examined the neutralizing effects of self-affirmation on threats to the self,
such as cognitive dissonance (Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995; Steele & Liu, 1983)
and rumination over being labeled as unintelligent (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg,
& Dijksterhuis, 1999).
Following these earlier studies, which made connections between self-threat
and self-affirmation, researchers in health psychology began to use a variety of selfaffirmation techniques. They investigated self-affirmation as a buffer to self-threat
prior to health interventions so that recipients of messages would be more likely to
accept the warnings instead of being closed off and defensive to a message that
challenged their life choices. Results from many of these studies indicate that those
who went through a self-affirmation manipulation were more likely to be accepting of
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health messages regarding caffeine consumption and breast cancer (Reed &
Aspinwall, 1998), alcohol consumption (Armitage, Harris, & Arden, 2011; Harris &
Napper, 2005), healthy eating habits (Epton & Harris, 2008), and smoking risks
(Armitage, Harris, Hepton, & Napper, 2008; Harris, Mayle, Mabbott, & Napper,
2007), especially when they were at greater risk. Additionally, in a double-blind study
by Armitage and others (2008), the self-affirmation manipulation was done
successfully at a factory employing a lower socioeconomic status (SES) population
with high-risk smokers, confirming the generalizability of the self-affirmation
procedure on a population that was less educated than the usual university sample.
Clearly, self-affirmation is a technique that is gaining attention because of its
demonstrated utility in many areas, as well as its ease of implementation. The studies
listed above used different self-affirmation techniques, such as writing long essays,
answering questions about helpfulness, or acknowledging one’s values. The variety of
techniques allows the researcher to choose between a longer or shorter task, as well as
choosing a simpler version for those outside of the university population, such as
adolescents (Sherman et al., 2013) and those with less education (Armitage et al.,
2008).
The Relevance of Cognitive Depletion
Increased cognitive load, known as ego depletion or cognitive depletion, is
experienced when the mind is working on a task and, in relation to research, it can be
imposed by requiring a person to do anything that involves their attention, such as
solving a puzzle, calling attention to detail, or multitasking. Cognitive depletion is
related to reduced self-control, as exemplified by emotional regulation, the ability to
9

delay gratification, and the capacity to resist temptation, among other consequences
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Depletion of self-control has been linked to increases
in unethical behavior (i.e., cheating; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011) as well
as increased aggression when provoked (Denson et al., 2011; DeWall et al., 2006).
Some of the earlier studies examined the neutralizing effects of self-affirmation on
threats to the self, such as cognitive dissonance (Aronson et al., 1995; Steele & Liu,
1983). Participants who went through the self-affirmation exercise showed an increase
in self-control, as demonstrated through a variety of tasks, such as pain tolerance, task
persistence, and delay of gratification, but only after experiencing a manipulated
cognitive depletion, which suggests that affirmation may help a person regain selfcontrol back to baseline, but not necessarily improve beyond that (Schmeichel &
Vohs, 2009).
The relationship between self-affirmation and implicit cognition measures has
been established more recently. Cognitive functioning in general, as measured by a
problem-solving task, was improved after a self-affirming task (Wen, Butler, &
Koutstaal, 2013). Sherman and others (2013) conducted a longitudinal study
examining the effects of self-affirmation on identity threat (i.e., stereotype threat) in
young Latino American students. They showed that a variety of self-affirming
exercises actually closed the academic achievement gap between Latino American and
European American students, wherein the Latino American students’ grades increased,
but the European American students’ grades did not. Similarly, Schmeichel and Vohs
(2009) reported increases in self-control in response to the self-affirmation task, but
only after ego depletion. Additionally, in a diary self-report, these students described
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feeling that they fit in more and had more motivation to do well. It is noteworthy that
for many students this effect continued for three years (Sherman et al., 2013). This
attenuation of stereotype threat through self-affirmation was also found by Shapiro,
Williams, and Hambarchyan (2013) in Black college student’s performance, as well as
women’s interest and performance in the STEM (i.e., science, technology,
engineering, and math) disciplines. Self-affirmation has also been shown to buffer
threats to self-esteem and subsequent resentful and defensive reactivity, which is
discussed in more detail in the section on shame and self-esteem (Monin, Sawyer, &
Marquez, 2008).
Shame and Affirmation
Shame and affirmation are the negative or positive (respectively) feelings
gained from an experience that contributes to one’s self-worth. Shame is the feeling
that there is something inherently bad or wrong within oneself, not to be confused with
the closely related feeling of guilt – the feeling that one did something wrong. To
clarify, shame is internal blame for a behavior or an attribution that is a reflection of
the self, as opposed to guilt, in which although the behavior itself was bad, the action
did not stem from something innately wrong with the self. Shame is a feeling gained
from an experience that negates our sense of internal goodness or adherence to values
that we view as positive because of the perception (real or imagined) of a negative
evaluation from others (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Cognitive
dissonance then results from this misalignment of behavior and valued attitude.
Conversely, affirmation is a feeling gained from a positive experience that reaffirms
our internal goodness or adherence to values that we view as positive. This affirmation
11

can originate from internal or external sources, depending on whether the value being
exhibited is externally or internally derived. This internal versus external source of
affirmation is not to be confused with the concept of internal and external locus of
control. Several studies have shown contradictory evidence as to whether locus of
control is related to shame, indicating that the external locus of control may be a
byproduct of repeated, context-specific shame experiences (e.g., Parsons & Betz,
2001), a failure to meet the expectations from external sources, like societal norms
(Madding, 1995), or a failure to meet the expectation from internal sources, for
example, in those who are “perfectionists” (Amster, 1994).
Shame, not Self-Esteem. Self-esteem can be viewed as three separate
constructs (see Brown & Marshall, 2006) – domain specific (i.e., social comparison in
abilities and attributes), state-based (i.e., the immediate feelings of shame or
affirmation from an experience), and global (i.e., self-esteem derived from a collection
of shame and affirmation experiences, which remains fairly stable in adulthood).
Domain- and state-based self-esteem are the feelings of self-worth attached to status,
which contribute to global self-esteem. Again, the higher one perceives their status to
be, the more they value their social position (Blader & Chen, 2012), and they respond
more intensely to threats to their position (Gruenwald, Kemeny, & Aziz, 2006),
especially narcissists (Bushman et al., 2009). Global self-esteem is a product of the
compounding effects of shame and affirmation experiences that determine one’s status
in different domains, and varies significantly from person to person depending on
what they value. Using this theory, the contradictory outcomes in research on the
relationship between self-affirmation and self-esteem can be explained. Self-
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affirmation exercises buffer threats to status, regardless of how high or low one
perceives one’s status to be. If someone is low in status in several domains, they are
likely low in global self-esteem. Conversely, if they are higher in status across several
domains, they are likely to be higher in global self-esteem. Self-affirmation buffers a
threat to their status, which has the potential to affect measures of their domain and
state self-esteem if their status in that situation is valued. We would not see immediate
effects in the collective or averaged global self-esteem because after a lifetime of
experiences, one event would be unlikely to make a measurable difference in the
average. In sum, depending on the type of self-esteem being measured (global,
domain, or state) and the perceived value of that status in a particular domain or state,
researchers may or may not find measurable changes or differences in self-esteem, but
they may find differences in shame proneness (trait shame) and changes in feelings of
shame before and after an attack on their status (state shame).
Present Study
Reactive aggression has been found to be directly related to weak self-control
and retaliatory behavior (DeLisi et al., 2008; DeWall et al., 2006). However, reactive
aggression can be attenuated through self-control training (Denson et al., 2011).
Studies have repeatedly shown that disrespect provokes anger, with increased
aggression if that disrespect is made in a public setting (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996;
Cohen et al., 1996; Felson, 1978; Miller, 2001). With status being determined through
social comparison, it is no wonder that being socially disrespected increases the effects
of shame and subsequent action to regain status. Self-affirmation tasks have been used
in a variety of areas to reduce defensiveness (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000), offset
13

feelings of schadenfreude (van Dijk, van Koningsbruggen, Ouwerkerk, & Wesseling
2011), increase prosocial feelings and behaviors (Thomaes, Bushman, de Castro, &
Reijntjes, 2012), buffer self-esteem (Monin et al., 2008), and restore self-control after
ego depletion (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). One could argue that aggression as a
response to being shamed is itself a form of affirmation. Even just through affirming
“toughness” prior to a threat, one can proactively maintain their status, effectively
avoiding shame (Cohen et al., 1996; Lukeszowski, Simmons, Anderson, & Roney,
2016). A recent study indirectly used self-affirmation to reduce aggression by
augmenting a message aimed to reduce relational aggression, in which damage is
caused to someone’s relationships or social status (Armitage & Rowe, 2016). Only
one study (Thomaes, Bushman, de Castro, Cohen, & Denissen, 2009) was found that
explored the direct effects of a self-affirmation exercise on aggression; the authors
found that self-affirmation can attenuate the self-threat experienced by narcissistic
adolescents. However, research has yet to investigate the effects of self-affirmation on
aggression in a non-clinical sample of adults. Accordingly, the present study will
examine these effects, as well as the interaction between self-affirmation and cognitive
depletion on reactive aggression to social provocation, defined as a threat to social
status but not necessarily a threat to self-esteem, as measured by the Point Subtraction
Aggression game. This task allows us to measure aggression in a controlled,
laboratory setting under the guise of a competitive one on one game of speed and
decision making abilities. The participants will be under the impression that they are
competing against a real opponent, but they will actually be responding to computer
generated provocations.
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Hypothesis 1. Reactive aggression will be greater for those in the cognitive
depletion group and the explicit shame group versus the control group. In other words,
if a person is cognitively exhausted through either direct (cognitive depletion) or
indirect (completing a shame measure) means, they will react more aggressively.
Hypothesis 2. Reactive aggression will be attenuated by completion of the
self-affirmation task in the cognitive depletion group and shame group, but not in the
control group.
Hypothesis 3. Experiential Shame Scale (ESS – an implicit shame measure)
scores will be significantly greater in the cognitive depletion and shame group (versus
the control), and will be attenuated by completion of the self-affirmation task (versus
the control).
Hypothesis 4. Implicit and explicit shame sub-scores will be predictors of
reactive aggression.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Design
The current study was both a within- and between-subjects experimental
design wherein participants were randomly assigned to one of six groups in a 3 x 2
factorial design. The first independent variable was being assigned to either
completing a cognitive depletion writing task, a control writing task, or a shamemeasurement task, the Test of Self-Conscious Affect, version 3 (TOSCA-3; Tangney,
Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000). The second independent variable was
completing a self-affirmation (SA) writing task or an “other-affirmation” (OA)
focused control writing task. Then they each compete independently in the Point
Subtraction Aggression game. In addition to the between-subject differences described
above, all participants complete an implicit shame measure both before these tasks and
after the final aggression measure to examine within-subject changes for each group.
Participants
Participants included in the study were 107 undergraduate students from the
University of Rhode Island in undergraduate psychology courses (i.e. General
Psychology, PSY113 and Quantitative Methods, PSY200). Six participants’ scores
were excluded for not meeting certain criteria (see Analysis of Assumptions).
Procedure
For recruitment purposes as well as to increase interest in “winning” the game,
students were informed that by participating, they would be winning entries into a
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drawing for a $100 Visa gift card. In fact, all students received one entry into the
drawing for participating. Upon signing up for the study, the student was assigned a
unique participant ID number reflective of the randomly assigned condition (See Table
1) to ensure responses were all associated with the same subject but anonymity was
preserved. They were brought into an office where they sat down at a computer station
and were given instructions on what to expect as well as a verbal run through of the
informed consent. The study was explained as an investigation on how several
cognitive exhaustion procedures affect reaction time and decision making. They were
told they would complete some questionnaires and hand written cognitive depletion
tasks while the other participant located in an adjacent room did a similar series of
tasks. When “both” participants finished with the pre-game tasks, they would play a
game with one another on the computer that measures reaction time and decision
making. After receiving answers to any questions, the participant reviewed the
informed consent on the computer screen and selected “I Accept” at the bottom if they
were willing to participate. The computer screen then told them to await further
instruction. Next, the research assistant gave the participant Harber’s (1995) Sources
of Validation Scale, which contained a list of traits and values (see Appendix A), and
asked them to rank order this list in order of personal importance to them, with one
being the most important through number 11 being the least important. Afterwards,
they completed the following measures and tasks as determined by their randomly
assigned condition.
“Pre-physical and cognitive state” questionnaire. First, all participants
completed the Experiential Shame Scale (ESS; Turner, 1998, 2014; see Appendix B)
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on the computer console which aimed to measure their baseline state shame under the
guise of being a physical and cognitive state questionnaire. They were told that this
was to measure their baseline and post-experiment physical and cognitive state from
their subjective perspective. Participants were asked to select a number from 1 to 7 for
each item, corresponding to how they felt at that moment on a continuum between two
opposite word states, with some of the items being reverse scored. There were three
categories (Physical, Emotional, and Social) relating to the sensations and experiences
of shame while retaining low face validity. The “physical” category had three items
(ex. Physically I feel… 1 = very warm – 7 = very cool). The “emotional” category had
four items (ex. Emotionally I feel… 1 = content – 7 = distressed). Finally, the “social”
category had three standard items (ex. Socially I feel like… 1 = talking – 7 = being
quiet) and one that was modified to fit the current research. The original body of
research pertained to academic performance and used 1 = “I AM willing to talk about
my grades with an acquaintance right now” to 7 = “I AM NOT willing to talk about
my grades with an acquaintance right now.” In an attempt to capture this from a
competitive / status standpoint, this research will use 1 = “If asked, my peers would
say I have ABOVE AVERAGE cognitive speed” to 7 = “If asked, my peers would say
I have BELOW AVERAGE cognitive speed.” The entire measure can be found in
Appendix B. When participants finished, the computer screen either instructed them to
continue to the next questionnaire or to raise their hand to ask the research assistant for
further instruction.
It was decided to use the ESS as a shame marker because it is a covert measure
of shame. The importance of using a covert measure of shame has been highlighted in
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the literature review but cannot be stressed enough because of the sensitive nature of
our implicit cognition to mere exposure to emotional words. This is the only measure
of state shame to the author’s knowledge that does not use any sort of explicit
emotional words that connect with experiences of shame, guilt, or embarrassment.
Rüsch et al. (2007) found that the ESS measure had some overlap with measures of
anxiety, however, many of our physiological reactions are self-described as anxiety
and when these feelings of arousal are explored in relation to the context in which they
are experienced, we find they are often misattributed based on manipulated conditions
(e.g., Dutton & Aron, 1974; Savitsky, Medvec, Charlton, & Gilovich, 1998; Schacter
& Singer, 1962). Arguably, it is more socially acceptable to claim one is anxious than
to admit one feels shame, so careful consideration of the context in which the feelings
occur is important in interpreting them from an objective perspective.
In 2014, Turner explored the effectiveness of the ESS scale in several studies
using shame as the predicted response to an experience of perceived failure elicited by
academic exam score feedback, wherein she successfully demonstrated satisfactory
inter-item construct validity (Cronbach’s α = 0.72) and good concurrent validity with
measures of shame, as well as state and global self-esteem. Furthermore, qualitative
feedback through interviews included reports of feelings of failure, wanting to “crawl
in a hole,” and wanting to hide the poor grade received from others, and other
theoretically related reactions associated with shame, such as reporting physiological
feelings of “heart sinking” and upset stomach that can be (mis)attributed to any of
several causes depending on the context. Further, the ESS showed no significant
correlation with social desirability, perhaps one of the most important factors after
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scale validity in measuring such a delicate topic. Therefore, through careful
consideration of the research question at hand, the ESS seemed like the best option for
an implicit shame measure, particularly since the current study will also have a
condition wherein an explicit shame measure is used.
“Cognitive depletion” tasks. Depending on the group the participant was
randomly assigned to, they either completed the cognitive depletion exercise, its
associated control exercise, or the Test of Self-Conscious Affect, version 3 (TOSCA3; Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000; see Appendix C), followed by
either the self-affirmation task or its associated control exercise.
Cognitive depletion manipulation. If the participant was randomly assigned to
the ego depletion task or the control task, the computer instructed them to raise their
hand to alert the research assistant who was prepared to give them the appropriate
instruction for their assigned task. In the cognitive depletion task, they were asked to
write a story about any recent trip (e.g., grocery store, different state, or different
country) but to avoid using the letters “a” or “n.” In the control group, participants
were asked to write the same story, but with no such constraint. The participants wrote
for 6 minutes. This technique has been used successfully in prior studies (e.g.,
Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). After the 6 minutes passed, the research assistant let them
know by tapping the participant on the shoulder and collected the form.
TOSCA-3. If the participant was assigned to complete the Test of SelfConscious Affect (TOSCA-3) questionnaire, upon completion of the ESS survey they
were told to click continue and proceeded onto the next screen. The instructions asked
the participant to imagine themselves in 16 different scenarios (11 negative and 5
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positive) and indicate how likely they would be to react in the given ways on a scale of
1 (“not likely”) to 5 (“very likely”). Each described reaction measures shame, guilt,
externalization of blame, or detachment (in negative scenarios), or guilt, shame,
externalization of blame, or pride (in positive scenarios). An example of a hypothetical
negative scenario would be, “You break something at work and then hide it.” The
response options are as follows: guilt “You would think: ‘This is making me anxious.
I need to either fix it or get someone else to.’”, shame “You would think about
quitting”, externalization of blame “You would think: ‘A lot of things aren’t made
very well these days.’”, and detached “You would think: ‘It was only an accident.’”
The entire measure can be found in Appendix C. The TOSCA remains one of the most
widely used measures of shame and guilt and its wide range of reliability and validity
studies across many subject pools, including college students, is discussed in Tangney,
Dearing, Wagner, and Gramzow (2000). Upon completion, the screen had the
participant raise their hand to alert the research assistant that they were ready for the
next task.
Self-affirmation manipulation. Next, participants completed the selfaffirmation or control written task. In the self-affirmation condition, also described to
the participant as a cognitive depletion task, the research assistant used their highest
ranked value from Harber’s (1995) Sources of Validation Scale and the participant
was instructed to write about why this value was important to them and to describe
three or four occasions when they exhibited this value. In the control condition, they
were given instructions that asked them to write about the value ranked 7 th, of
moderate to lower value, and why that value may be important to the average college
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student. The participants wrote for 10 minutes. This manipulation has been
successfully used in previous studies in combination with cognitive depletion (e.g.,
Monin et al., 2008). The need to keep the self-affirmation condition deceptive and
labeled as a cognitive task was decided upon because in one series of studies it was
found that the effects of self-affirmation are weakened when the participants become
aware of the process and expected outcomes (Sherman et al., 2009). After the 10
minutes had passed, the research assistant alerted the participant and collected the
form.
Measure of reactive aggression. Next, the participant competed in the Point
Subtraction Aggression Paradigm-First Session (PSAP-FS; Cherek, 1981), a
laboratory based measure of reactive aggressive in which participants believe they are
paired with a real opponent (actually a computer) to compete for points that can be
exchanged for a reward. The participant is told that the goal of the task is to
accumulate more points than their opponent. In the current experiment, participants
were told that they could trade in their points for entries in the raffle for the gift card.
Prior to the research session, the following instructions (adapted from Cherek,
Lane, Dougherty, Moeller, & White, 2000) for the PSAP portion were given to them
and read aloud by the research assistant.
For your next task, you will be able to earn points which
will be exchanged for entries into the raffle for the $100 gift
card. You will be paired up with another participant located in
the alternative lab site in the building.
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You will play a game against another participant located at an
alternative lab site in the building for 25 minutes. You have been
randomly assigned to the Point Deletion condition, and the second
participant has been assigned to the Point Stealing condition.
As you can see, the response controller has three buttons labeled
A, B, and C. When the session starts, the letters A, B, and C and a
counter will appear on the computer screen. The counter will be at zero.
Pushing the A button will cause the B and C letter to go off the screen.
Pushing the A button approximately 100 times will cause the A letter to
go off the screen, and add one point to the counter. Each point is worth
one raffle entry. After about one second, the A, B, and C letters will
come back on the computer screen. At that time you can continue to
press A or switch to button B or C.
During the session the counter on your computer screen may
become larger and one point will be subtracted. After the point is
subtracted, the counter will return to its normal size. This means that
one of the other persons has subtracted a point from your counter by
pushing button B on their response panel. Every point that this person
subtracts from your counter is added to their counter.
If you push button B on your response panel, the A and C letters
will go off the screen. After you have pushed button B approximately
10 times, the letter B will go off the screen and one point will be
subtracted from the other person’s counter. After about one second, A,
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B, and C letters will come back on the computer screen. You
can continue to press button B and subtract additional points
from the other person or switch to button A to gain points or C.
If you subtract a point from the other person, it will not be
added to your counter. Remember, points that are subtracted
from your counter by the other person are added to that person’s
counter.
If you push button C on your response panel, the A and
B letters will go off the screen. After you have pushed button C
approximately 10 times, the letter C will go off the screen and
your earnings displayed on the counter will be protected from
point subtractions initiated by the other person for some period
of time. After about one second, the A, B, and C letters will
come back on the computer screen. You can continue to press
button C or switch to button A or B.
In summary, pressing A 100 times gains you a point,
pressing B 10 times deletes a point from your opponent, and
pressing C 10 times will protect your points from your opponent
for a short period of time.

No additional information regarding the procedure was provided. Portions of
the instructions were repeated if the subjects asked questions. Studies show its validity
in measuring aggression (i.e. tendency to push the B button) with a variety of
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populations, such as male parolees convicted of violent versus non-violent crimes
(Cherek, Moeller, Schnapp, & Dougherty, 1997; Cherek, Schnapp, Moeller, &
Dougherty, 1996), in children with aggression issues and ADHD (Casat, Pearson, van
Davelaar, & Cherek, 1995), and moderate correlations between aggression on the
PSAP and self-report measures (Gerra et al., 2001, 2007). Several studies have also
used the measure with undergraduate college students (e.g., Pinto, Maltby, Wood, &
Day, 2012). A shorter version of the original PSAP using just the first session (PSAPFS; approximately 25 minutes) was validated for potential use in expanded settings
when multiple trials over the course of hours and/or days was too time consuming
(Golomb, Cortez-Perez, Jaworski, Mednick, & Dimsdale, 2007).
The proportion of times the participant chooses the B button response,
subtracting a point from the opponent (a behavior intending to cause harm) with no
potential gain of the point to their own total, as compared to A and C is the measure of
aggression (PSAP B ratio: # of times B Option/A + B + C Options = Aggression
Score).
“Post-physical and cognitive state” questionnaire. Afterwards, participants
all filled out the Experiential Shame Scale (ESS; Turner, 1998, 2014) again to measure
their current state shame to be compared to scores on the ESS pre-test at the
beginning, once again under the guise of being a physical and cognitive state
questionnaire.
Demographic Questions. Finally, the participants filled out a demographic
questionnaire on the computer that asked them about their identified sex,
race/ethnicity, age, college major, a variation of the MacArthur subjective community
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and national socioeconomic status (SES; Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000),
and political and social values (see Appendix D).
Debriefing. Upon completion of the post-ESS, participants saw a thank you
message on the computer screen and were asked to report to the lab attendant that they
were ready for debriefing. They were informed that we were looking at the interaction
of self-affirmation and cognitive depletion on aggression levels. They were told that
every participant got entered into the drawing for the $100 gift card and that there was
never an actual “opponent,” but rather they were responding to computer generated
provocations that were trying to elicit a response of aggressiveness (B-button) or
defensiveness (C-button). We gauged the extent to which the deception worked (e.g.,
surprised look, asked them for feedback) and it was recorded in our participant
records. The participant was thanked for their time and asked to sign an “affidavit”
that they would keep their knowledge about the current study to themselves to ensure
a clean slate for each participant in the future.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

The data were downloaded from Survey Monkey and Inquisit 5.0 (for the
PSAP) into Microsoft Office Excel for organization and then uploaded into SPSS 23.0
for subsequent analysis.
Demographics
One hundred and one participants were included in the final data analysis.
Reasons for the exclusion of some participants are given under Analysis of
Assumptions. The majority of participants identified as female (n = 73; 72.3%). Of the
101 participants, 64% identified as Caucasian / European / White, 21% Native
American / Mexican / Hispanic, 12% African American / Black / West Indies, and 3%
Asian / Pacific Islander. It should be noted that some participants selected more than
one identity, and so the percentages reported should not be computed to represent the
raw number. The participants ranged from 19 to 29 years of age (M=19.76,
SD=1.372). Participants identified their preferred political party as either Independent
(43.6%), Democrat (24.7%), Libertarian, (17.8%), or Republican (13.9%), as well
their social values as being primarily Moderate (43.6%), Liberal (24.8%), Libertarian
(16.8%), or Conservative (14.8%).
The subjective social status (see Table 2) was negatively skewed, more so for
the community standing (Mean=11.95, Median=12, Mode=16) than the national
standing (Mean=10.23, Median=11, Mode=11), which is reflective of the population
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wherein 53% of the student body came from the top 20% of earners, with a median
family income of $115,600, according to recent data collected by The Equality of
Opportunity Project (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, & Yagan, 2017).
Analysis of Assumptions
Assumptions were assessed for the general linear model, including normality,
multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, skewness and kurtosis, and identification of
outliers (z-score >= 3), using scatterplots, Q-Q plots, box and whisker graphs, and
histograms. Six participants were considered outliers because they were found to have
too few total points in the PSAP (n=3), indicating a lack of effort or understanding, or
no attempts at the B option were made and the participant vocalized suspicion of the
attempted deception (n=3), and were excluded from the data analysis, resulting in the
final N, 101. No data were found to be missing.
Descriptive Statistics
Full descriptive values, including means and standard deviations (see Table 2)
and frequencies for discrete variables (see Table 3) are available in the Appendix.
Pearson correlations were unsurprisingly significant for several pairs of variables (see
Table 4).
Hypotheses 1 & 2: Cognitive Depletion, Self-Affirmation, and Reactive
Aggression
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to evaluate the effects of the
cognitive depletion / TOSCA tasks and self-affirmation tasks on reactive aggression.
There was no significant interaction between the self-affirmation group and the
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cognitive depletion group (M = 27.611, SE = 3.654), the TOSCA group (M = 34.782,
SE = 3.766), and the control group (M = 26.887, SE = 4.026) compared to the otheraffirmation control (MCognitiveDepletion = 32.124, SECognitiveDepletion = 3.456; MTOSCA =
29.345, SETOSCA = 3.89; MControl = 27.991, SEControl = 3.368), F(2, 95)=.924, p=.40,
partial η2=.019, but the explicit shame measure followed by self-affirmation condition
did trend opposite to the hypothesis and the other groups (see Figure 1). Although the
means trended in the hypothesized direction between the cognitive depletion group (M
= 29.867, SE = 2.515), the TOSCA group (M = 32.064, SE = 2.707), and the control
group (M = 27.439, SE = 2.625), the ANOVA was not significant and carried a small
effect size, F(2,95)=.754, p=.473, partial η2=.016. A follow up t-test for selfaffirmation (M=29.8365, SE=2.135) and other-affirmation (M=29.8213, SE=2.0873)
revealed no significant differences in reactive aggression as well, t(99)=.005, p=.996,
95% CI [-5.9291, 5.9595].
Hypothesis 3: Cognitive Depletion, Self-Affirmation, and ESS
An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed to compare the ESS
post-scores between cognitive groups, affirmation groups, and their interaction, while
controlling for differences in ESS pre-scores to isolate the effect the independent
variables had on Experiential State Shame (see Figure 2). Overall, there was a
difference between cognitive groups, F(2, 94)=6.926, p=.002, η 2 =.128, with followup test indicating a significant difference between both the cognitive depletion
(M=39.836, SE=.904, p=.018) and TOSCA (M=40.922, SE=.974, p=.002) groups
compared to the control group (M=36.156, SE=.943). There was a significant
difference in ESS post-scores between the self-affirmation (M=37.146, SE=.792)
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group and other-affirmation (M=40.797, SE=.742), F(1,94)=11.319, p=.001, η 2 =.107.
No interaction between cognitive groups and affirmation was found, F(2, 94)=1.151,
p=.321, η 2 =.024.
Hypothesis 4: Implicit and Explicit Shame and Reactive Aggression
Significant but small relationships were found between reactive aggression and
both the ESS pre- (r=.221, p=.026) and post-scores (r=.231, p=.02), but not at all
between reactive aggression and any of the TOSCA subscales, including shame.
However, ESS post-scores did have moderately sized relationships with TOSCA’s
shame (r=.411, p=.022), externalization of blame (r=.366, p=.043), and detachment
(r=.374, p=.038), and approached significance in an inverse relationship with guilt
(r=-.343, p=.059). Relationships involving ESS pre-scores were slightly larger with
shame (r=.464, p=.009) and externalization of blame (r=.566, p=.001), with
nonsignificant but similar trends with guilt (r=-.309, p=.091) and detachment (r=.345,
p=.057).
To further explore the differences between those higher and lower in ESS postscores, a median split was done to categorize high ESS (n=53, M=45.62, SE=.681) and
low ESS (n=48, M=31.79, SE=.598). There was a significant difference in reactive
aggression between the high (M=33.0488, SE=2.07386) and low (M=26.2725,
SE=2.03226) ESS groups, t(99)=2.326, p=.022, Cohen’s d=.4642, 95%CI[.99471,
12.55773]. There was also a significant difference in shame scores between high
(n=19, M=54.37, SE=1.573) and low (n=12, M=47.45, SE=2.323) ESS groups,
t(29)=2.097, p=.021, Cohen’s d = .925664, 95%CI[1.09, 12.147], as well as
externalization of blame scores for the high (M=38.95, SE=1.989) and low (M=32.92,
30

SE=1.764) ESS groups, t(29)=2.097, p=.045, Cohen’s d= .803909, 95%CI[.149,
11.912].
Exploratory Data Analysis: Gender Differences
Unexpected differences were found between those identifying as male (n=28)
and female (n=73). Although not significant, the data trend was reversed in that, for
males, aggression was greater in the self-affirmation condition (n=11, M=35.1847,
SD=11.9718) than the other-affirmation condition (n=17, M=29.8174, SD=13.3991),
compared to females, where aggression was slightly less in the self-affirmation
condition (n=36, M=28.2023, SD=15.1319) than the other-affirmation condition
(n=37, M=29.8231, SD=16.327; see Figure 3). This interaction was observed in the
cognitive depletion and control conditions, but for the TOSCA condition, selfaffirmation resulted in increased aggression scores for both males (n=4, M=38.1867,
SD=15.81363) and females (n=36, M=33.6475, SD=16.99534) compared to otheraffirmation (n=5, MMALES=26.86445, SD=16.02585; n=37, MFEMALES=30.5857,
SD=18.72272). ESS post-scores did follow the hypothesized trend of being greater in
the other-affirmation as compared to the self-affirmation groups (see Figure 4),
indicating a divergence in the relationship between ESS and aggression (rMEN=.078,
p=.693; rWOMEN=.327, p=.005). Obviously, a larger sample size is needed to further
explore if these trends persist.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The present study attempted to manipulate reactive aggression by randomly
assigning some participants to complete cognitively exhausting tasks followed by
either self-affirmation or other-affirmation tasks to examine a potential attenuation of
that behavior. Implicit experiential shame was predicted to have a positive relationship
with reactive aggression. As predicted, the cognitive depletion and TOSCA survey
task increased feelings of implicit experiential shame, which were reduced by the
completion of the self-affirmation task, but the results were mixed on the reactive
aggression measure. Participants in the TOSCA condition who completed the follow
up self-affirmation task were actually more aggressive than those who completed the
other-affirmation task, a finding contrary to the initial hypothesis and to the trend of
the cognitive depletion group. Further exploratory analysis found that gender may be
playing a role in the variance that lessened the expected effects found between groups.
Valuation and motivation of outcomes as well as gender differences could offer some
explanation as to why the results were more inconclusive and mixed than expected.
Can We Really Measure Aggression?
Self-affirmation and cognitive depletion, both alone and in conjunction, did not
significantly affect the propensity to react aggressively in the PSAP game. While this
result was counter to the original hypothesis, it is not entirely surprising. It may reflect
the measure itself, and not the effectiveness of the cognitive depletion or selfaffirmation tasks, considering the tasks did affect ESS outcomes. As suggested in the
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literature review, reactive aggression is linked to feeling status threat in an area that
someone values. A recent study by Velez and Hanus (2016) found that in order for an
outcome to impact one’s self-perception, the person must value the outcome enough
so that his or her identity is actually contingent upon it. They had participants get
positive or negative feedback on a purported intelligence test and on a follow-up video
game. Only those participants who valued success in the video game benefited from
the positive feedback (i.e., affirmation) of doing well, that is, having it serve as a
buffer to the negative feedback on the intelligence test. Those who received positive
feedback in the video game but did not place any sort of value on being successful in
that measure (i.e., it did not affirm their self-worth) were in turn more defensive to the
negative feedback on the intelligence test (i.e., status threat). There are several
different personal interpretations of the PSAP that a participant could have. If they
neither value winning competitive events, nor view success in the PSAP game as
being reflective of or connected to their self-worth, no reactivity would be expected.
So instead of measuring reactive aggression, the PSAP may be measuring the value
someone puts on being a winner and their unwillingness to hurt (albeit not physical)
another person to gain that win.
While the self-affirmation task inherently guarantees that a participant focuses
on a value that they care about, the PSAP outcome is not guaranteed to be valued,
particularly since the outcome cannot be singularly defined. It could be that
participants have a macro-level view of success being an overall win against the other
person, which can be secured without stealing from them by earning points faster or
protecting one’s own points. Higgins (2012) describes two different motivations for
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attaining positive outcomes, one being promotion-focused (i.e., wanting to win) and
one being prevention-focused (i.e., not wanting to lose). The PSAP, wherein a person
may or may not actually place value on the outcome, is much like the video game test
in Velez and Hanus (2016). A participant’s reactivity, be it offensive or defensive, is
not guaranteed and, therefore, the PSAP may not be a good measure of aggression, in
general, but rather a measure of how important it is for them to win (promotionfocused) or not lose (prevention-focused). The importance of internal values and
motivation was exemplified in Siegel, Brockner, Wiesenfeld, and Liu (2016) in
conjunction with the use of a self-affirmation manipulation. Self-affirmation was more
likely to attenuate the avoidance of self-threatening modes of evaluation (i.e., skillsbased versus a more arbitrary measure) for more prevention-focused individuals. In
other words, if a person was more susceptible to self-threat, self-affirmation buffered
their avoidance of evaluation measures that opened them up to criticism, but the selfaffirmation had much less of an effect on those who were more promotion-focused.
The participant may also focus on the micro-level provocations and feel that
they cannot let the opponent’s thievery go unpunished, if taken as an affront to their
sovereignty over point accrual. Conversely, they could avoid punishing the other
person if they felt that retaliation would reflect negatively on their integrity in front of
the researcher. They could be weighing the consequences of each reaction
simultaneously, wherein one value (i.e., justified retribution versus the cost of
appearing petty) is of greater importance to them as an individual. This conundrum is
what makes measuring reactive aggression difficult in the first place. Reactive
aggression is not an inherently measurable construct, but rather a broad concept that is
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used to label a specific type of reaction to a self-threat, arbitrarily defined to fit the
measure. The intensity of this reactive aggression can only be expected to the extent
that some part of the measure (e.g., direct benefit of the reaction OR being observed
behaving that way) holds significant value for the participant.
Shame
There was a significant increase in ESS scores that was similar across
conditions, indicating some level of arousal, but given the variability of interpretation
based on the context, it is difficult to conclude that this was an increase in shame
rather than an increase in anxiousness. The increase was prominent in the cognitive
depletion and TOSCA conditions, but not in the control condition, which indicates that
cognitive load played a similar role. These effects were subdued when participants
followed up the cognitive depletion or TOSCA exercise with the self-affirmation task.
The relationships between the cognitive depletion and TOSCA, but not the control
task, with self-affirmation is not surprising, as it parallels the finding from previous
studies showing that self-affirmation only mediates effects when the person is at some
sort of deficit, be it through cognitive depletion (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009) or
stereotype threat (Sherman, et al., 2013). What is important to note is that taking the
TOSCA questionnaire resulted in similar arousal to a very different, unrelated task,
that is, writing a story and leaving out certain letters to induce cognitive exhaustion.
One requires a person to reflect on their moral integrity, the other is a simple letteromitting task, yet both result in the increase in arousal.
The relationship between a greater ESS post-score and increased aggressive
responses in the PSAP further underscores the potential overlap of intense cognitive
35

processing and ethical decision making with the area of the brain that mediates
reactive aggression. One may argue that answering the hypothetical questions in the
TOSCA, and not the content of the TOSCA itself, is what results in the similarity with
cognitive depletion, but further analysis within the TOSCA group shows a relationship
between greater ESS pre- and post-scores and increased propensity for shame,
externalization of blame, and detachment related responses, and a decreased
propensity for guilt. Considering the difference between measures, TOSCA looks at
shame proneness by asking participants what they would do/feel in hypothetical
situations while the ESS looks at physiological indicators that measure feelings of
shame in that moment. If a person is self-reporting a tendency for feeling ashamed,
they may have a higher self-awareness wherein they would try to avoid shame by not
hurting another person, while also protecting themselves from the shame of losing.
This may indicate that while some people may be more or less prone to feeling
ashamed, situational shame is still highly dependent on a person’s personal value in
the worth associated with the task at hand. The participants who had greater ESS postscores need not have general shame proneness, but could have a situation specific
shame, in this case tied to losing or being taken advantage of.
Those who scored higher in the ESS follow-up measure had greater reactive
aggression percentages independent of task condition, and they also had greater scores
in TOSCA’s shame and externalization of blame subscales. The latter seems
counterintuitive, shame being an internalization of blame while the other shows a
focus on external factors, but this is similar to the original findings of Tangney,
Wagner, Fletcher, and Gramzow (1992). None of the subscales are necessarily
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mutually exclusive within an individual, and it would make theoretical sense for a
person who has shame proneness to try to counteract that emotion by attempting to
place the blame on external circumstances and people.
Gender Differences
Participants were given the option to choose between more than just male or
female, but all chose to identify with one of those two categories. In exploratory data
analysis, a major difference in the trends was found for aggression as it related to
gender and ESS scores. One way men are socialized to exhibit status is with direct,
physical aggression (Kimmel & Mahler, 2003), but it is often overlooked that women
also commit aggressive acts in response to status threat since these acts are more often
indirect and verbal (Willer, Rogalin, Conlin, & Wojnowicz, 2013). In a review of the
literature concerning gender differences in anger and aggression, Campbell and
Muncer (2006) determined that men and women do not differ in reporting, willingness
or ability to express anger, and, in some cases, women actually reported more anger
than men, even after controlling for differences in how anger is expressed (Mirowsky
& Ross, 1995).
Gender differences were not initially expected in this study because the PSAP
does not measure typical physical aggression primarily exhibited by males nor the
indirect aggression primarily exhibited by females. This characterization is supported,
if only in a null fashion, by an earlier study (Allen & Dougherty, 1996) that found no
difference in aggressive responses between males and females as measured by the
PSAP. However, as suggest previously, we cannot conclude that the choice to react
aggressively was similar between genders based on valuation of the outcome at hand.
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In a recent study using the PSAP (Geniole, Cunningham, Keyes, Busseri, &
McCormick, 2015), the provocation cost (number of points per provocation) and
frequency (how many times during the interval provocation occurred) were
manipulated to examine differences in how males and females would retaliate and to
what they would attribute their behavior (i.e., tangible reward = points or status-threat
= frequency). They found that men were more likely to retaliate when the frequency of
provocation was greater, a threat to their status, whereas females were more likely to
retaliate when the cost was greater, a threat to the tangible reward; furthermore, the
groups explicitly acknowledged those associated reasons for their retaliation. Women
are less likely to challenge or attack a provoker, at least when under low to moderate
duress, but, as provocation increases, gender differences become less pronounced
(Bettencourt & Miller, 1996). In other words, during low and medium levels of
provocation, men were more likely to respond aggressively, but as the provocation
increased, women and men were similarly prone to reactive aggression.
In the current study, each participant (regardless of gender identity)
experienced the same cost and frequency of provocation, and aggression scores did not
differ significantly in the cognitive control / other-affirmation condition, similar to
Allen and Dougherty (1996), although male scores were greater in that condition,
which could be explained by Bettencourt and Miller (1996) since the experience was
that of a moderate level of provocation. If, as suggested by Geniole and others (2015),
males reacted based more on perceived status-threat, then this may be what was being
effectively manipulated by the self-affirmation task. However, contrary to the
hypothesis, the self-affirmation task increased the aggressive response rather than
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decreasing it. One study found that a greater sense of entitlement not only predicted
unforgiving attitudes, but that self-affirmation exacerbated feelings of vengefulness
and malevolence (Exline & Zell, 2009).
Not only is there evidence that a greater sense of entitlement is found in
college students (Twenge, 2006), but also that this entitlement is greater in males than
females (Ciani, Summers, & Easter, 2010). Males in both the cognitive depletion and
control groups were more aggressive in the self-affirmation conditions than the otheraffirmation condition, and the amount of aggression was inversely related to their
implicit shame (ESS) scores. This was a departure from the expected trend that was
found with females, wherein aggression was mediated by self-affirmation and had a
positive correlation with their ESS scores. If ESS scores accurately reflect feelings of
implicit state shame, then it makes sense that a decreased sense of shame would allow
for a bolstered sense of entitlement, especially in response to a perceived injustice or
status-threat, considering that greater entitlement has also been linked to a greater
sensitivity to feeling offended by transgressions from others (Exline, Baumeister,
Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004).
Limitations and Future Directions
Although the study used experimental methods to isolate the effects of selfaffirmation and cognitive depletion, the sample consisted entirely of college students,
as is the case with a lot of psychology research. Unfortunately, as discussed in the
previous section, college students, particularly males, might be more inclined to have a
greater sense of entitlement, which could lead to dramatic differences in the dependent
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variables. Given the number of conditions, statistical power was limited in finding
group differences between genders within the predetermined conditions.
Future studies could replicate the current design, but should increase the
sample size and attempt to get an even distribution of self-identified males and
females to further explore this possible interaction between gender and selfaffirmation and their effects on aggression. Future studies should also consider
comparing self-reported shame and the ESS scores across all the conditions to
contribute to the legitimacy of ESS as an implicit measure of shame, and additionally
explore the gender differences in how shame contributes to aggression. It is worth
noting once again that the use of the term aggression may be too all-encompassing of
specific behaviors and reactions, as exemplified in Geniole and others (2015), and
consideration of extraneous variables, such as sense of entitlement (Exline et al.,
2004), motivation for positive outcomes (Higgins, 2012; Siegel et al., 2016), and
valuation of outcomes (Velez & Hanus, 2016), is necessary when interpreting the
intensity and intent of an individual’s reactions to interpersonal confrontation.
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APPENDICES

Table 1
Task Order by Condition
Condition

Task Order

1

ESS

Control

OA

PSAP

ESS

2

ESS

Control

SA

PSAP

ESS

3

ESS

CogDep

OA

PSAP

ESS

4

ESS

CogDep

SA

PSAP

ESS

5

ESS

TOSCA

OA

PSAP

ESS

6

ESS

TOSCA

SA

PSAP

ESS

Note. ESS = Experiential Shame Scale, CogDep = Cognitive
Depletion task, TOSCA = Test of Self-Conscious Affect Version 3,
Control = Control for Cognitive Depletion task, SA = SelfAffirmation task, OA = Other-Affirmation / Control for SelfAffirmation task, PSAP = Point Subtraction Aggression Paradigm

41

42

101

101

101

101

SES USA

ESS Before

ESS After

Aggression
Percent

31

31

31

31

Shame

Externalization

Guilt

Detachment

TOSCA

101

N
101

SES
Community

Age

30.94

65.81

36.61

51.81

29.8284

39.05

35.83

10.23

11.95

Mean
19.7624

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

1.058

1.291

1.478

1.422

1.48682

.827

.809

.311

.314

SE
.13654

5.893

7.190

8.229

7.918

14.94232

8.308

8.129

3.127

3.160

SD
1.37221

24

34

35

31

65.01

36

38

13

12

Range
10.00

16

44

21

32

2.17

24

18

3

4

Minimum
19.00

40

78

56

63

67.19

60

56

16

16

Maximum
29.00

34.729

51.695

67.712

62.695

223.273

69.028

66.081

9.778

9.988

Variance
1.883

-.530

-.856

.412

-.343

.177

.148

.406

-.556

-.570

Skewness
3.970

.421

.421

.421

.421

.240

.240

.240

.240

.240

SE
.240

-.153

1.581

.310

-.299

-.329

-.785

.184

-.004

-.431

Kurtosis
21.830

.821

.821

.821

.821

.476

.476

.476

.476

.476

SE
.476

Table 3. Frequency Table: Discrete Variables x Affirmation Condition
Affirmation Condition
Self-Affirmation

Other-Affirmation

Total

Percent

N

N

N

%

Female

36

37

73

72.3

Male

11

17

28

27.7

Cognitive Depletion

17

19

36

35.6

Control

14

20

34

33.7

TOSCA

16

15

31

30.7

Low ESS

28

20

48

47.5

High ESS

19

34

53

53

Conservative

7

8

15

14.9

Moderate

17

27

44

43.6

Libertarian

7

10

17

16.8

Liberal

16

9

25

24.8

Republican

7

7

14

13.9

Independent

17

27

44

43.6

Libertarian

7

11

18

17.8

Democrat

16

9

25

24.8

101

-

Gender

Cognitive Task

ESS Group*

Social Values

Political Party

Affirmation Condition
Total
47
54
Note : * ESS Groups determined through median split of ESS post-scores

43

44

-.030
-.214
.055

7. Guilt

8. Detachment

9. Local SES

**

*

-.042

.203

.042

.090

-.092

-.189

-.003

.413

**

-.365

-

2

**

**

**

-.170

-.176

-.154

.345

-.309

.566

.464

.698

-

3

*

-.016

-.119

*

.005

.147

.033

.374

*

.340

.387

*

*

5

-.343

.366

.411

-

4

*

-.265

.165

.404

-.104

-

6

*

*

-.141

.121

-.400

-

7

-.102

-.294

-

8

.377

-

9

**

-

10

11

-.294
.083
.068
.129
.061
-.199
-.364
Note. *p>.05, **p>.01. Shame, Externalization, Guilt, and Detachment were only measured in the TOSCA Group, n =31. Gender
1=Female, 2=Male.

.087

.041

6. Exterternalization

11. Gender

.175

5. Shame

.060

.231

4. ESS Post

10. National SES

.221

3. ESS Pre
*

.019

2. Increase in ESS
*

-

1. Aggression

1

Table 4. Correlation Matrix

Figure 1. Mean Aggression for Cognitive Task x Affirmation Task
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Figure 2. Mean ESS Post-score for Cognitive Task x Affirmation Task. Covariates
appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: Total Before = 35.83
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Figure 3. Mean Aggression Percent – Condition x Gender.

47

Figure 4. Z-Score Trend Comparison between Aggression and ESS Post-Score for
Condition x Gender.
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Appendix A
Sources of Validation Scale
RANKING OF PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND VALUES
Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be important to you,
some of which may be unimportant. Please rank these values and qualities in order of
their importance to you from 1 to 11 (1 = most important item, 11 = least important
item). Use each number only once.
___ Artistic skills / aesthetic appreciation
___ Sense of humor
___ Relations with friends / family
___ Spontaneity / living life in the moment
___ Social skills
___ Athletics
___ Musical abilities / appreciation
___ Physical attractiveness
___ Creativity
___ Business / managerial skills
___ Romantic values
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Appendix B
Experiential Shame Scale
Please indicate the number that best describes how you feel right now when
comparing the two opposite word-states. For example, if you are feeling very
warm (compared to very cool), mark 1; however, if you are feeling very cool
(compared to very warm), mark 7. If you are feeling in-between the two states,
find the number between 1 and 7 that best describes how you feel right now.
Physically, I feel:
1. Very Warm

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

R

Very Cool

2. Normal Heartbeat

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Rapid Heartbeat

3. Pale

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Flushed

4. Good

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Bad

5. Clear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Confused

6. Content

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Distressed

7. Calm

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Highly

Emotionally, I feel:

Agitated/Aroused
Socially, I feel like:
8. Hiding

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

R

Being Sociable

9. Talking

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Being Quiet

10. No one sees me

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

People are looking at me

11. If asked, my peers

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

If asked, my peers

would most likely

would most likely say I

say I have ABOVE

have BELOW

AVERAGE

AVERAGE cognitive

cognitive speed.

speed.

R = Reverse-scored item
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Appendix C
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed
by several common reactions to those situations.
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then
indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you
to rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same
situation, or they may react different ways at different times.
For example:
A. You wake up early one Saturday morning. It is cold and rainy outside.
a) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news. 1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
b) You would take the extra time to read the paper.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

c) You would feel disappointed that it’s raining.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

d) You would wonder why you woke up so early.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

In the above example, I've rated ALL of the answers by choosing a number. I
indicated a "1" for answer (a) because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early
on a Saturday morning -- so it's not at all likely that I would do that. I chose a "5" for
answer (b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very
likely). I chose a "3" for answer (c) because for me it's about half and half.
Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn't -- it
would depend on what I had planned. And I chose a "4" for answer (d) because I
would probably wonder why I had awakened so early.
Please do not skip any items -- rate all responses.
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1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o'clock, you realize you stood him
up.
a) You would think: "I'm inconsiderate."

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

b) You would think: "Well, they'll understand."

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

c) You'd think you should make it up to him as soon 1---2---3---4---5
as possible.
not likely very likely
d) You would think: "My boss distracted me just
before lunch."

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

2. You break something at work and then hide it.
a) You would think: "This is making me anxious. I 1---2---3---4---5
need to either fix it or get someone else to."
not likely very likely
b) You would think about quitting.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

c) You would think: "A lot of things aren't made
very well these days."
d) You would think: "It was only an accident."

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

3. You are out with friends one evening, and you're feeling especially witty and
attractive. Your best friend's spouse seems to particularly enjoy your company.
a) You would think: "I should have been aware of what 1---2---3---4---5
my best friend is feeling."
not likely very likely
b) You would feel happy with your appearance and
1---2---3---4---5
personality.
not likely very likely
c) You would feel pleased to have made such a good
1---2---3---4---5
impression.
not likely very likely
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d) You would think your best friend should pay
attention to his/her spouse.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

e) You would probably avoid eye-contact for a long 1---2---3---4---5
time.
not likely very likely
4. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out
badly.
a) You would feel incompetent.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

b) You would think: "There are never enough hours
1---2---3---4---5
in the day."
not likely very likely
c) You would feel: "I deserve to be reprimanded for 1---2---3---4---5
mismanaging the project."
not likely very likely
d) You would think: "What's done is done."

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

5. You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error.
a) You would think the company did not like the
co-worker.
b) You would think: "Life is not fair."

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

c) You would keep quiet and avoid the co-worker.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

d) You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the
1---2---3---4---5
situation.
not likely very likely

6. For several days you put off making a difficult phone call. At the last minute you
make the call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well.
a) You would think: "I guess I'm more persuasive than 1---2---3---4---5
I thought."
not likely very likely
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b) You would regret that you put it off.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

c) You would feel like a coward.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

d) You would think: "I did a good job."

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

e) You would think you shouldn't have to make calls 1---2---3---4---5
you feel pressured into.
not likely very likely
7. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face.
a) You would feel inadequate that you can't even
1---2---3---4---5
throw a ball.
not likely very likely
b) You would think maybe your friend needs more
practice at catching.
c) You would think: "It was just an accident."
d) You would apologize and make sure your friend
feels better.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

8. You have recently moved away from your family, and everyone has been very
helpful. A few times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as
soon as you could.
a) You would feel immature.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

b) You would think: "I sure ran into some bad luck." 1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
c) You would return the favor as quickly as you could. 1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
d) You would think: "I am a trustworthy person."
e) You would be proud that you repaid your debts.
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1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

9. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal.
a) You would think the animal shouldn't have been
1---2---3---4---5
on the road.
not likely very likely
b) You would think: "I'm terrible."

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

c) You would feel: "Well, it was an accident."
1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
d) You'd feel bad you hadn't been more alert
1---2---3---4---5
driving down the road.
not likely very likely
10. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well. Then you find out you
did poorly.
a) You would think: "Well, it's just a test."

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

b) You would think: "The instructor doesn't like me." 1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
c) You would think: "I should have studied harder." 1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
d) You would feel stupid.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

11. You and a group of co-workers worked very hard on a project. Your boss singles
you out for a bonus because the project was such a success.
a) You would feel the boss is rather short-sighted.
b) You would feel alone and apart from your
colleagues.
c) You would feel your hard work had paid off.
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1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

d) You would feel competent and proud of yourself.
e) You would feel you should not accept it.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

12. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who's not there.
a) You would think: "It was all in fun; it's harmless." 1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
b) You would feel small...like a rat.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

c) You would think that perhaps that friend should
1---2---3---4---5
have been there to defend himself/herself.
not likely very likely
d) You would apologize and talk about that person's 1---2---3---4---5
good points.
not likely very likely
13. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending
on you, and your boss criticizes you.
a) You would think your boss should have been more 1---2---3---4---5
clear about what was expected of you.
not likely very likely
b) You would feel like you wanted to hide.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

c) You would think: "I should have recognized the
1---2---3---4---5
problem and done a better job."
not likely very likely
d) You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect."

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

14. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children.
It turns out to be frustrating and time-consuming work. You think seriously about
quitting, but then you see how happy the kids are.
a) You would feel selfish and you'd think you are
1---2---3---4---5
basically lazy.
not likely very likely
b) You would feel you were forced into doing
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1---2---3---4---5

something you did not want to do.

not likely very likely

c) You would think: "I should be more concerned
about people who are less fortunate."

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

d) You would feel great that you had helped others. 1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
e) You would feel very satisfied with yourself.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

15. You are taking care of your friend's dog while they are on vacation and the
dog runs away.
a) You would think, "I am irresponsible and
incompetent.”

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

b) You would think your friend must not take very
1---2---3---4---5
good care of their dog or it wouldn't have run not likely very likely
away.
c) You would vow to be more careful next time.
d) You would think your friend could just get a
new dog.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

16. You attend your co-worker's housewarming party and you spill red wine on their
new cream-colored carpet, but you think no one notices.
a) You think your co-worker should have expected
1---2---3---4---5
some accidents at such a big party.
not likely very likely
b) You would stay late to help clean up the stain
after the party.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

c) You would wish you were anywhere but at
the party.

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

d) You would wonder why your co-worker chose to
1---2---3---4---5
serve red wine with the new light carpet.
not likely very likely
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Appendix D
Demographics
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in the United States?
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